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Our embodied capacity for action and our dispositions towards goals define our 
perception of a situation and possible actions. Thus, situations are not constitutive 
of action, but they demand that we act. For Shane Ralston, the situations that call 
for action are historical, imagined, or projected debates involving John Dewey. 
When Dewey is portrayed not just as a presenter of theory, but as an actor in de-
bates grounded in time, place, and daily life consequences, we understand his ar-
guments in new ways. When he is called upon to act by engaging in debates that 
arose even long after his death, the interaction (or transaction) of philosopher and 
situation produces new meaning. 
The non-teleological, creative conception of the relationship between actor 
and situation has been developed well by Hans Joas, building upon the work of 
George Herbert Mead, Dewey, and other pragmatists. As the actor engages with 
changing situations, new meanings emerge. There is thus a quasi-dialogical rela-
tionship between action and situation, which implies a creativity of action, nei-
ther pre-determined by intentionality nor pre-established by the situation.1 Hu-
bert Dreyfus expresses a similar idea in a passage about falling in love: “In such a 
creative discovery the world reveals a new order of signification which is neither 
simply discovered nor arbitrarily chosen.”2 The reconstructions of Dewey that we 
observe in Ralston’s reconstructed debates are prime examples of what Joas calls the 
creativity of action. They are not merely a means to understand a pre-determined 
Dewey; they reveal “a new order of signification.”
The debates presented cleverly demonstrate the quasi-dialogical relation 
between situation and actor. Instead of being simply another reading of Deweyan 
texts, they are an effort to bring Dewey to life, not to “maintain an immune monas-
tic respectability” but to participate actively “in the living struggles and issues” of 
the times 3. Of course, Dewey, as much or more than any other major philosopher, 
understood philosophy as active participation in life and embodied that in his own 
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work. Moreover, growth is a unifying concept linking many aspects of Dewey’s 
philosophy. It seems especially fitting for Ralston to ask how Dewey’s ideas them-
selves would grow in response to new challenges.
Dewey was a consummate debater, not as we might think today of one who 
excels at oral debate competitions with assigned positions to defend, but rather as 
someone who wrestled with important public policy issues and intellectual discus-
sions of his times, defending positions that were deeply held, but often unpopular. 
He engaged with Bertrand Russell on theories of logic,with Walter Lippman on the 
role of expertise in public deliberations, with Kenneth Burke and with Randolph 
Bourne about democracy and World War I, with Jane Addams regarding violence 
in the context of the Pullman strike, and with many others on diverse topics.
One consequence of this wrestling with issues of the day is that Dewey’s ideas 
are best understood not as fixed elements within an abstract system. Instead, as 
he saw them, they are tools for inquiry situated in the context of active struggles 
of the times and his own engagements as a public intellectual. Others have used 
reconstructed debates to examine Dewey. For example,  Paul Stob reads him as en-
gaging in a postmortem dialogue with Burke. The areas of agreement and points 
of contention between Burke and Dewey become both more lively and more com-
prehensible when presented in the context of concrete historical reality.4 Similarly, 
John Capps brings Dewey into dialogue with AIDS activists and creationists, and 
Michael Eldridge, the dedicatee of Ralston’s book, does the same with a dispute put 
to the grievance committee that Dewey chaired for the New York Teacher’s Union.5
Ralston takes the idea of debate as a medium for understanding much further. 
The first two debates he considers are among ones that Dewey actually had with 
his contemporaries, one with Leon Trotsky and the second with Robert Hutchins. 
Next, he considers two imagined debates with contemporary intellectuals, E. D. 
Hirsch and Robert Talisse. Both of these scholars have criticized Dewey’s ideas long 
after his death; Ralston helps us to see, or reconstruct, a Deweyan response. In the 
latter part of the book, he considers contemporary public policy debates, one on 
home schooling versus public schooling and one on George W. Bush’s claim that 
terrorists, dictators, and their supporters hate America for its freedom. For the de-
bates involving Trotsky and Hutchins we have documentation for both Dewey and 
his opposition. For Hirsch and Talisse, we have only their voices, and must do a 
bit more work to project Dewey’s rebuttal. In the final examples, we have circum-
stances that Dewey did not encounter, so that we must imagine more fully how his 
theories might respond, or evolve to respond.
In addition to the six debates that receive the full treatment, there is effectively 
another debate in the introduction about historical inquiry. I found this to be one 
of the most interesting. Dewey sees history as growing out of present conditions. 
Drawing from his view of logic as a theory of inquiry, he writes “We naturally 
remember what interests us and because it interests us. The past is recalled not 
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because of itself but because of what it adds to the present”6. C. I. Lewis and others 
interpreted Dewey’s view as sinking into total relativism, with each historian writing 
from his or her own vantage point. Ralston does a nice job of presenting this debate, 
and consequently, setting up the rationale for the book’s project of relating Dewey 
to present interests.
None of the debates are presented as simple win/lose propositions. In fact, 
in each case, except the last one, Ralston searches for the common ground as well 
as differences. He also does a good job showing weaknesses in Dewey’s position, 
for example, regarding Dewey’s understanding of Marxism in the Trotsky debate. 
As a result, the debates are presented in an engaging way, which calls the reader 
in to see what Dewey will do next. They fulfill the promise of showing Dewey in a 
manner fitting to his philosophy, and revealing more about Dewey’s ideas than we 
might glean from a straight reading.
However, the debate format does have some limitations. Fitting six major 
debates into 100 pages doesn’t leave much room for developing systems of thought 
or accounting for nuances in positions. In the first one (Trotsky), we need to under-
stand Marxism and pragmatism, their contrasting views of history, the resulting 
thesis that they are incompatible, Dewey’s misreading of Marxism, and eventu-
ally a possible synthesis that can be applied to fair trade activism. Ralston makes a 
good effort to do this, but I felt the need for more elaboration on all the positions 
presented, perhaps another 100 pages to explore the ways in which Marxism and 
pragmatism overlap as well as the ways they do not, not simply going from incom-
patibility to synthesis.
Another concern about the format is that, despite allowing a few criticisms of 
Dewey, it tends to give us one position, then a response from Dewey showing how 
that position is wrong. Even for readers sympathetic to Dewey (or Deweyan analysis, 
as we should say for the later chapters), the resolution of the debate comes across 
as too easy, too complete. In each case, there could be more left unresolved. For 
example, Ralston makes the case that Hutchins over-emphasizes subject matter (the 
Great Books), and separates subject matter from method. He argues in that chapter 
that a richer vision can be found in John A. Rice’s view of the curriculum as a tool 
for individual growth. For Rice, as with Dewey, the classic texts were only one means 
of getting experience for growth. However, a good case can be made that the Great 
Conversation idea inherent in the Great Books approach is a dialogical method 
supportive of pragmatist inquiry, despite the heated disagreements between Dewey/
Rice and Hutchins. Thus, method is very present, just not elaborated. Moreover, the 
realizations of Hutchins’s ideas in actual curricula have led them to evolve, just as 
Dewey’s have. One can find, as Ralston does, that Dewey’s view is ultimately more 
comprehensive, more balanced, more open, more coherent, and so on, yet still leave 
more room for questions about the role of accumulated cultural knowledge, how 
much shared subject matter there should be, or how subject matter and method 
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interact within different disciplines. Ralston does articulate five major points of 
convergence between Dewey and Hutchins. However, it would be in keeping with 
the book’s premise of a living Dewey to ask less for a comfortable resolution and 
more for questions for further inquiry.
Attempting to encapsulate Dewey’s work, John McDermott writes that the 
philosopher “believed that ordinary experience is seeded with possibilities for sur-
prises and possibilities for enhancement if we but allow it to bathe over us in its own 
terms.”7 Ralston does an excellent job springing some of those surprises by taking 
the reader through actual, imagined, and projected debates involving Dewey. In so 
doing, he reveals how Deweyan engagement fosters an enhanced understanding of 
both past and contemporary issues.  It is also a “call for Deweyan pragmatists to 
engage in historical inquiry. . . . To step back as a way of moving forward, to em-
brace a more nostalgic from of pragmatism”8. The generative Dewey presented here 
is an excellent introduction to Dewey’s political and pedagogical theory as well as 
to how that theory emerges from and returns to concrete social reality.
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